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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT OF CALIFORNIA
 CENTRAL DISTRICT — WESTERN DIVISION

RESHMA KAMATH,

Plaintiff,

v.

JUDITH ASHMANN-GERST, et al.,

Defendants.

Case No. 8:23-cv-02193-SVW-SSC
 Judge: Hon. Stephen V. Wilson

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
 AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
 MOTION TO DISMISS FIRST
 AMENDED COMPLAINT

Date: June 3, 2024
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 350 W. First Street
 Courtroom 10A, 10th Floor
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The Judicial Defendants¹ respectfully submit the following memorandum of points and authorities in support of their motion to dismiss the First Amended Complaint filed by Plaintiff Reshma Kamath (“Kamath”) under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).

I.

INTRODUCTION

This action principally arises out of the imposition of sanctions against Kamath, a licensed California attorney, based on her egregious conduct in two appeals heard in the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District (“Court of Appeal” or “Second Appellate District”). *See Schwartzman v. South Coast Tax Resolution, Inc.*, Case Nos. B314770, B320410, 2023 WL 7969843, at *7-11 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2023); *Czech v. Herrera*, Case No. B316020, 2023 WL 7968410, at *4-5 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 17, 2023). Both opinions and sanctions orders were authored by Justice Ashmann-Gerst with Justice Lui concurring.

In *Schwartzman*, the Court of Appeal observed that “[f]or over two years, Kamath has persisted in a troubling pattern of behavior in which, from the moment she is given an indication that things may not pan out for her client, she unleashes a flood of unsupported claims of bias in an attempt to disqualify the presiding tribunal and delay any potential adverse rulings.” 2023 WL 7969843, at *10. To support the imposition of sanctions, the court found that “Kamath’s conduct is not becoming of

¹ The Judicial Defendants consist of Defendants (1) the Honorable Maria E. Stratton, Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Eight, (2) the Honorable Elwood G. Lui, Administrative Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, (3) the Honorable Judith Ashmann-Gerst, Associate Justice of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, Division Two, (4) Melissa Real, Deputy Clerk of the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, (5) the California Court of Appeal, Second Appellate District, (6) the Honorable Michael J. Shultz, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, (7) the Honorable Barbara Ann Meiers, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, (8) the Honorable Rolf M. Treu, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Ret.), (9) the Honorable William D. Stewart, Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles (Ret.), (10) the Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles, and (11) the Judicial Council of California.

1 an attorney[,]” and that “[b]y turning her client’s case into a showcase for her
2 conspiracies of personal persecution, Kamath has done a disservice to [her client]
3 and to the courts.” *Id.* at *11.

4 In *Czech*, in response to a motion to dismiss the appeal, “Kamath filed an
5 opposition ... that leveled outrageous comments against the judiciary and Presiding
6 Justice Lui, prompting [the Court of Appeal] to notify the State Bar of her behavior.”
7 2023 WL 7968410, at *5. “Even after [the court] issued an order notifying the parties
8 that Kamath’s opposition was being forwarded to the State Bar, Kamath persisted in
9 raising unfounded and offensive accusations against th[e] court.” *Id.* The Court of
10 Appeal accordingly held “Kamath is subjected to monetary sanctions payable to the
11 court for her relentless offensive filings and communications (as well as attempted
12 communications that have now been blocked).” *Id.*

13 Kamath thereafter filed the instant action in an apparent effort to continue her
14 offensive and baseless accusations of bias against the judiciary. The original
15 complaint alleged that Justices Ashmann-Gerst and Lui, along with Justice Stratton
16 and Deputy Clerk Melissa Real, “displayed racial discrimination and misogyny
17 towards [Kamath].” (Dkt. No. 1 ¶¶ 9-12; *see also id.* ¶ 18 [alleging Second Appellate
18 District “has demonstrated racism and gender discrimination in their practices,
19 conduct, and lack thereof ...”].) Real is a deputy clerk in the Second Appellate
20 District who handled filings in *Schwartzman* and *Czech*, while Justice Stratton is
21 alleged to have issued a ruling in another matter mirroring language used in the
22 opinions issued in *Schwartzman* and *Czech*.

23 Kamath has since filed a First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) totaling 100
24 pages and containing 500 paragraphs. (Dkt. No. 15.) The FAC makes the same
25 outrageous accusations against Justices Ashmann-Gerst, Lui, and Stratton, Deputy
26 Clerk Real, and the Second Appellate District. (*Id.* ¶¶ 129-132, 138.) The FAC also
27 adds new, baseless allegations of bias and racism against Judge Meiers, (*id.* ¶¶ 15,
28 115), who presided over proceedings in the trial court in *Schwartzman* and about

1 whom Kamath made numerous “disturbing” and “negative comments.” 2023 WL
2 7969843 at *2. The FAC also names as defendants other judges of the Superior Court
3 of California, County of Los Angeles (“Superior Court”), namely Judge Shultz and
4 retired Judges Treu and Stewart, the Superior Court itself, and the Judicial Council
5 of California (“JCC”).² (*Id.* ¶¶ 15, 27-38, 41, 57-80, 87-90, 94-96, 116-118.) The
6 FAC asserts 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 claims against the Judicial Defendants for
7 alleged racial and gender discrimination, (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 226-236, 338-366), and
8 various state law claims, including negligence, negligent hiring, and defamation. (*Id.*
9 ¶¶ 212-225, 237-339, 367-495.) The FAC seeks damages in excess of \$100 million
10 and injunctive and declaratory relief concerning the past actions of the Judicial
11 Defendants. (*Id.* Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-3.)³

12 The instant action is subject to dismissal on multiple grounds. First, the FAC
13 does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it fails to contain a
14 short and plain statement of Kamath’s claims. Second, with the exception of Deputy
15 Clerk Real, the action against the Judicial Defendants is foreclosed by judicial
16 immunity, which prohibits claims against judicial officers arising out of judicial acts
17

18 ² Such claims were previously raised in a separate action filed by Kamath in this
19 District in October 2023. In that action, Kamath unsuccessfully moved to disqualify
20 District Judge John F. Walter and Magistrate Judge David T. Bristow on the basis
21 that “both are ‘presumably White, Male Individuals’ and, as a result, are likely to be
22 biased in reviewing the race-and gender-based claims [Kamath] asserts in th[e]
23 action.” *Kamath v. Superior Court of California, County of Los Angeles*, Case No.
24 LA CV23-08979 JFW (DTBx), 2023 WL 9419160, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 13, 2023)
(Kronstadt, J.). The court appropriately denied Kamath’s motion, reasoning that “[a]
25 suggestion that a judge cannot administer the law fairly because of the judge’s racial
26 and ethnic heritage is extremely serious and should not be made without a factual
27 foundation going well beyond the judge’s membership in a particular racial or ethnic
28 group.” 2023 WL 9419160, at *2. In what can only be characterized as judge-
shopping, Kamath dismissed the action without prejudice and added the claims raised
therein to her FAC. (*See* L.R. 41-4, 83-1.2.2.)

³ Kamath’s practice of suing judges is not limited to state court judges or this
District. In an action in the Northern District of California, District Judge William
Alsup held Kamath in civil contempt for failure to comply with orders directing her
to pay sanctions. *Quintara Biosciences, Inc. v. Ruifeng Biztech Inc.*, Case No. C 20-
04808 WHA, 2023 WL 7555284, at *2 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 13, 2023). Kamath responded
by filing an action against Judge Alsup and his clerk asserting similar claims of
discrimination as those alleged in this action. *See Kamath v. Muelman, et al.*, N.D.
Cal. Case No. 5:23-cv-6494-PCP.

1 within their jurisdiction. Third, the action against Deputy Clerk Real is barred by
2 quasi-judicial immunity, which prohibits claims against court clerks for tasks that are
3 an integral part of the judicial process. Fourth, Kamath’s claims are precluded by the
4 Eleventh Amendment, which precludes suits for damages, injunctive relief, and
5 declaratory relief against the JCC, California courts, and state court judges and
6 employees sued in their official capacities. Fifth, the action is prohibited by the
7 *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, which prevents federal courts from hearing de facto
8 appeals of state court decisions. Finally, the state law damages claims are unavailing
9 because the FAC fails to allege compliance with California’s Government Claims
10 Act, under which Kamath was required to present a government claim. The Court
11 should therefore dismiss the action against the Judicial Defendants without leave to
12 amend.

13 II.

14 LEGAL STANDARD

15 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) allows a defendant to move to
16 dismiss a complaint for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter. Because federal
17 courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, “a federal court is presumed to lack
18 jurisdiction in a particular case unless the contrary affirmatively appears.” *Stock W.,*
19 *Inc. v. Confederated Tribes*, 873 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1989). A party who brings
20 a Rule 12(b)(1) challenge may do so by referring to the face of the pleadings or by
21 presenting extrinsic evidence. *See White v. Lee*, 227 F.3d 1214, 1242 (9th Cir. 2000).
22 In the former, “the challenger asserts that the allegations contained in a complaint are
23 insufficient on their face to invoke federal jurisdiction.” *Safe Air for Everyone v.*
24 *Meyer*, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004).

25 A motion to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) is a
26 challenge to the sufficiency of the pleadings set forth in the complaint. A dismissal
27 is proper under Rule 12(b)(6) where there is either a “lack of a cognizable legal
28 theory” or “the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory.”

1 *Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dept.*, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1988). A Rule
2 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim may also challenge defenses disclosed on
3 the face of the complaint or which are apparent from matters subject to judicial
4 notice. *Weisbuch v. County of Los Angeles*, 119 F.3d 778, 783 n.1 (9th Cir. 1997);
5 *MGIC Indem. Corp. v. Weisman*, 803 F.2d 500, 504 (9th Cir. 1986); *Mack v. South*
6 *Bay Beer Distributors, Inc.*, 798 F.2d 1279, 1282 (9th Cir. 1986), *overruled on other*
7 *grounds by Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino*, 501 U.S. 104 (1991).

8 Courts evaluate whether a complaint states a cognizable legal theory or
9 sufficient facts in light of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2), which requires “a
10 short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”
11 *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662, 677-78 (2009). Each allegation in a complaint also
12 must be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 nevertheless
13 requires a plaintiff to plead each claim with sufficient specificity to “give the
14 defendant fair notice of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.”
15 *Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotations omitted);
16 *U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003) (recognizing
17 parties must “make their pleadings straightforward, so that judges and adverse parties
18 need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud”). “While legal conclusions can
19 provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual
20 allegations.” *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 679.

21 III.

22 ARGUMENT

23 A. THE ACTION AGAINST THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS FAILS 24 TO SATISFY RULE 8

25 In order to satisfy Rule 8, a complaint must contain “a short and plain statement
26 of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2).
27 Each allegation in a complaint must also be “simple, concise, and direct.” Fed. R.
28 Civ. P. 8(d)(1). Rule 8 “requires parties to make their pleadings straightforward, so

1 that judges and adverse parties need not try to fish a gold coin from a bucket of mud.”
2 *U.S. v. Lockheed-Martin Corp.*, 328 F.3d 374, 378 (7th Cir. 2003).

3 The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit has affirmed
4 dismissal on Rule 8 grounds where the complaint is “argumentative, prolix, replete
5 with redundancy, and largely irrelevant,” *McHenry v. Renne*, 84 F.3d 1172, 1177,
6 1180 (9th Cir. 1996), and where the complaint is “verbose, confusing and
7 conclusory,” *Nevijel v. North Coast Life Ins. Co.*, 651 F.2d 671, 674 (9th Cir. 1981).
8 The rationale for such dismissals has been explained as follows:

9 Prolix, confusing complaints ... impose unfair burdens on
10 litigants and judges. As a practical matter, the judge and
11 opposing counsel, in order to perform their responsibilities,
12 cannot use [the] complaint ... and must prepare outlines to
13 determine who is being sued for what. Defendants are then
14 put at risk that their outline differs from the judge’s, that
15 plaintiffs will surprise them with something new at trial
16 which they reasonably did not understand to be in the case
17 at all, and that res judicata effects of settlement or judgment
18 will be different from what they reasonably expected.

15 The judge wastes half a day in chambers preparing the
16 ‘short and plain statement’ which Rule 8 obligated
17 plaintiffs to submit. He then must manage the litigation
18 without knowing what claims are made against whom. This
19 leads to discovery disputes and lengthy trials, prejudicing
20 litigants in other case[s] who follow the rules, as well as
21 defendants in the case in which the prolix pleading is filed.
22 *McHenry*, 84 F.3d at 1179-80.

19 The FAC contains anything but “a short and plain statement” of each claim, or
20 “simple, concise, and direct” allegations. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), (d)(1). Rather,
21 as noted above, the FAC spans 100 pages and contains 500 paragraphs. (Dkt. No.
22 15.) The averments in the FAC are also argumentative, confusing, and almost entirely
23 conclusory. While the FAC alleges widespread racism and bias involving the Judicial
24 Defendants spanning multiple lawsuits and courts, it is impossible to determine from
25 the FAC the manner in which each defendant participated in this alleged conspiracy
26 against Kamath. Indeed, the Judicial Defendants are lumped together with multiple
27 other defendants and are alleged to have participated in Kamath’s conspiracies in an
28 entirely conclusory manner. Such allegations fail to satisfy Rule 8.

B. THE ACTION AGAINST JUSTICES ASHMANN-GERST, LUI, AND STRATTON, JUDGES MEIERS, SHULTZ, TREU, AND STEWART, THE SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT, THE SUPERIOR COURT, AND JCC IS FORECLOSED BY JUDICIAL IMMUNITY

It is well-settled that judges are granted absolute immunity from civil liability for their judicial actions. *Lund v. Cowan*, 5 F.4th 964, 970 (9th Cir. 2021); *Duvall v. County of Kitsap*, 260 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2001); *Ashelman v. Pope*, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc); *Regan v. Price*, 131 Cal.App.4th 1491, 1495 (Ct. App. 2005); *Soliz v. Williams*, 74 Cal.App.4th 577, 585-586 (Ct. App. 1999); *Howard v. Drapkin*, 222 Cal.App.3d 843, 851 (Ct. App. 1990). “This absolute immunity insulates judges from charges of erroneous acts or irregular action, even when it is alleged that such action was driven by malicious or corrupt motives, [citation], or when the exercise of judicial authority is ‘flawed by the commission of grave procedural errors.’” *In re Castillo*, 297 F.3d 940, 947 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 359 (1978)). “Judicial immunity applies however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff.” *Ashelman*, 793 F.2d at 1075 (internal quotation marks omitted). “Disagreement with the action taken by [a] judge,” even one resulting in “tragic consequences,” “does not justify depriving that judge of his immunity.” *Stump*, 435 U.S. at 363 (applying judicial immunity to judge who approved petition for sterilization even if approval was in error).

Judicial immunity is only overcome if the actions were “nonjudicial actions, i.e., actions not taken in the judge’s judicial capacity” or were “actions, though judicial in nature, taken in the complete absence of all jurisdiction.” *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9, 11-12 (1991) (superseded by statute on other grounds). Regarding the former, “[a]n act is considered ‘judicial’ when it is a function normally performed by a judge and the parties dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” *Sidiakina v. Bertoli*, No. C 10-03157 JSW, 2012 WL 12850130, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 7, 2012) (citing *Stump*, 435 U.S. at 362).

Here, the claims against the Judicial Defendants (except Deputy Clerk Real who enjoys quasi-judicial immunity as set forth *infra*) unequivocally arise from judicial acts. Starting with Justices Ashmann-Gerst and Lui, the FAC complains about comments they made with regard to Kamath and her conduct in the Court of Appeal. The FAC alleges they “used words like ‘conspiracies’ in describing [Kamath][,]” referred to Kamath’s comments about Justice Lui and the judiciary as “insulting,” “inflammatory,” and “unfounded,” described conduct of Kamath as “slow” and “delayed,” “called [Kamath] ‘dense,’” and incorrectly stated Kamath was on vacation when a filing was due. (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 158, 159, 163, 165, 173); *see also Schwartzman*, 2023 WL 7969843, at *11 (referring to Kamath’s “conspiracies of personal persecution[.]”); *Czech*, 2023 WL 7968410, at *4 (labeling Kamath’s remarks about the judiciary and Justice Lui as “unfounded, outrageous, offensive, and insulting” and “inflammatory”); *Id.* at *5 (describing Kamath’s misconduct as including “unreasonably delay[ing] in sharing the appellate record in violation of [the California Rules of Court]”). The FAC further avers that Justice Stratton used the words “insulting,” “inflammatory,” and “unfounded” to describe Kamath’s comments in a ruling in another appeal. (*Id.* ¶ 178.)

As to Judge Meiers, who presided over *Schwartzman* in the trial court, the FAC alleges “[she] demonstrated her racism for over a year constantly berating [Kamath] – acting extremely abusive and demeaning – [and] causing White attorneys extreme[] latitude.” (*Id.* ¶ 187); *see also Schwartzman*, 2023 WL 7969843 at *3 (detailing in-court exchange between Judge Meiers and Kamath). The FAC further avers that Judge Stewart told Kamath in another matter, “Shut up[,] shut your mouth,” and ordered Kamath to appear in-person to apologize to the court. (*Id.* ¶¶ 57, 61.) Regarding Judge Shultz, the FAC alleges “he was ‘furious’ and made contemptuous orders[.]” with regard to Kamath in another action, including striking a substitution of attorney form filed by Kamath. (*Id.* ¶¶ 70, 74.) Finally, in yet another unspecified action, the FAC avers Judge Treu ignored the alleged untimeliness of an anti-SLAPP

1 motion and “rule[d] on the [motion] in favor of all-White cross-defendants” (*Id.*
2 ¶¶ 414, 447, 465, 493.)

3 It is well-settled that court orders and decisions are ordinary judicial functions
4 protected by judicial immunity. *Duvall*, 260 F.3d at 1133 (“Ruling on a motion is a
5 normal judicial function[.]”); *Ray, Jr. v. Bruiniers*, No. C 10–824 SI (pr), 2010 WL
6 3448320, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sep. 1, 2010) (“Deciding an appeal and writing an opinion
7 announcing the decision are judicial acts squarely within the jurisdiction of a state
8 appellate judge.”). The Ninth Circuit has also expressly held that “[a judge’s] in-court
9 statement easily falls within the purview of a judicial act.” *Lund*, 5 F.4th at 972.
10 Indeed, “judicial immunity shields even incorrect or inappropriate statements if they
11 were made during the performance of a judge’s official duties.” *Id.*

12 Based on the foregoing, Justices Ashmann-Gerst, Lui, and Stratton, and Judges
13 Meiers, Stewart, Shultz, and Treu, are absolutely immune from liability in this action.
14 Insofar as the claims against the Superior Court, Second Appellate District, and JCC
15 are based on the judicial acts of the individual justices and judges, such immunity
16 also forecloses Kamath’s claims against those entities. *Id.* (affirming dismissal of
17 claim against superior court based on judicial immunity of superior court judge); *Reis*
18 *v. D’Braunstein*, No. SA CV 08-0754-AG (ANx), 2008 WL 11342704, at *2 (C.D.
19 Cal. Dec. 15, 2008) (holding “the broad doctrine of judicial immunity” covers the
20 Superior Court of California for actions taken by its judges). Kamath’s claims against
21 the Judicial Defendants (except Deputy Clerk Real) are therefore barred by judicial
22 immunity and should be dismissed.

23 **C. THE ACTION AGAINST DEPUTY CLERK REAL IS BARRED**
24 **BY QUASI-JUDICIAL IMMUNITY**

25 “Court clerks have absolute quasi-judicial immunity from damages for civil
26 rights violations when they perform tasks that are an integral part of the judicial
27 process.” *Mullis v. United States Bankruptcy Court*, 828 F.2d 1385, 1390 (9th Cir.
28 1987) (applying quasi-judicial immunity where clerks accepted and filed incomplete

1 bankruptcy petition and later refused to accept amended petition); *see also Moore v.*
2 *Brewster*, 96 F.3d 1240, 1244 (9th Cir. 1996) (superseded by statute on other
3 grounds) (applying immunity where clerk deceived plaintiff regarding the status of
4 supersedeas bond and improperly conducted hearings to assess costs against
5 plaintiff); *Morrison v. Jones*, 607 F.2d 1269, 1273 (9th Cir. 1979) (applying quasi-
6 judicial immunity where clerk failed to provide notice of court order). The Ninth
7 Circuit has also “extended absolute quasi-judicial immunity ... to court clerks and
8 other non-judicial officers for purely administrative acts – acts which taken out of
9 context would appear ministerial, but when viewed in context are actually a part of
10 the judicial function.” *Castillo*, 297 F.3d at 952 (applying absolute quasi-judicial
11 immunity a failure to provide notice of a hearing and mismanagement of a court's
12 docket because such actions are a part of the judicial function).

13 Here, the FAC complains about Deputy Clerk Real rejecting filings from
14 Kamath while accepting filings from “White Attorneys,” failing to include Kamath’s
15 filings on the register of actions, delaying the entry of a default “for a White
16 attorney[,]” providing legal advice, citing statutory codes, and communicating ex
17 parte with Kamath. (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 141-142, 144-150, 153-155; *see also* Request for
18 Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Ex. A at 4 [10/17/23 Entry]; RJN, Ex. C at 4 [6/27/23
19 Entry].) The management of the Court of Appeal’s docket and processing court
20 filings are indisputably an integral part of the judicial process. *Castillo*, 297 F.3d at
21 951; *Mullis*, 828 F.2d at 1390; *see also Bettencourt v. McCabe*, No. 1:17-CV-00646-
22 DAD-SAB, 2017 WL 4180979, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 21, 2017) (court clerks’
23 determination of “what documents should be filed and what documents should be
24 returned to the filer because of deficiencies ... [is] integral part[] of the judicial
25 process that involve[s] the exercise of discretionary judgment”); *Coulter v. Murrell*,
26 No. 10cv102-IEG(NLS), 2011 WL 13208995, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 1, 2011), *aff’d*,
27 463 Fed. Appx. 610 (9th Cir. 2011) (quasi-judicial immunity barred Section 1983
28 claim alleging denial of right to access to courts because “[t]he processing of

documents submitted to the Clerk for filing is an integral part of the judicial process”). The action against Deputy Clerk Real is therefore barred by the doctrine of quasi-judicial immunity.

D. THE ACTION AGAINST THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS IS ALSO PRECLUDED BY THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Eleventh Amendment bars suits for damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief against “a state, an ‘arm of the state,’ its instrumentalities, or its agencies.” *Franceschi v. Schwartz*, 57 F.3d 828, 831 (9th Cir. 1995); *Greater Los Angeles Council on Deafness, Inc. v. Zolin*, 812 F.2d 1103, 1110 (9th Cir. 1987). Not only are the JCC and California courts deemed state agencies for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment, *Wolfe v. Strankman*, 392 F.3d 358, 364 (9th Cir. 2004) (overruled on other grounds by *Munoz v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County*, 91 F.4th 977, 980-81 (9th Cir. 2024)); *Simmons v. Sacramento County Superior Court*, 318 F.3d 1156, 1161 (9th Cir. 2003); *Zolin*, 812 F.2d at 1110, but the Eleventh Amendment also extends to claims against state court judges and employees in their official capacities, as they are considered arms of the state, *Lund*, 5 F.4th at 969; *Simmons*, 318 F.3d at 1161.

Here, the FAC seeks damages, injunctive relief, and declaratory relief concerning the lawfulness of past actions taken by the individual Judicial Defendants in their official capacities (i.e., Justices Ashmann-Gerst, Lui, and Stratton, and Judges Meiers, Stewart, Shultz, and Treu), and requests identical relief against the entity Judicial Defendants (i.e., the Superior Court, Second Appellate District, and JCC) based on the same or related conduct. Such claims are unequivocally precluded by the Eleventh Amendment.

E. THE ACTION AGAINST THE JUDICIAL DEFENDANTS ALSO RUNS AFOUL OF THE *ROOKER-FELDMAN* DOCTRINE

“Under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine, ‘a state-court decision is not reviewable by lower federal courts.’” *Hooper v. Brnovich*, 56 F.4th 619, 624 (9th Cir. 2022)

1 (quoting *Skinner v. Switzer*, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011)). In *Hooper*, the plaintiff had
2 unsuccessfully moved in state court for an order permitting him to conduct DNA and
3 fingerprint analysis on a crime scene. 56 F.4th at 621. The plaintiff thereafter filed a
4 lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in federal court seeking a “declaratory judgment that
5 the [state] statutes providing for forensic testing of DNA and other evidence are
6 unconstitutional as applied to him as well as an injunction ordering defendants to
7 permit him to conduct the forensic testing.” *Id.* at 621-22. The Ninth Circuit held that
8 the federal district court “lacked subject matter jurisdiction under the *Rooker-*
9 *Feldman* doctrine because th[e] action amounted to an improper appeal of the state
10 courts’ judgment.” *Ibid.*

11 The Ninth Circuit observed that *Rooker-Feldman* bars lower federal courts
12 from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over an action brought as a direct appeal
13 as well as a “‘de facto equivalent’ of such appeal.” *Id.* at 624 (quoting *Morrison v.*
14 *Peterson*, 809 F.3d 1059, 1069-70 (9th Cir. 2015)). “To determine whether an action
15 functions as a de facto appeal, [a court should] ‘pay close attention to the *relief* sought
16 by the federal-court plaintiff.’” *Ibid.* (quoting *Cooper v. Ramos*, 704 F.3d 772, 777-
17 78 (9th Cir. 2012)) (emphasis in original). A court lacks subject matter jurisdiction
18 under the *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine when the federal court plaintiff “complains of a
19 legal wrong allegedly committed by the state court, and seeks relief from the
20 judgment of that court.” *Noel v. Hall*, 341 F.3d 1148, 1163 (9th Cir. 2003).

21 Where a plaintiff files a claim in federal court alleging an erroneous ruling by a
22 state court, “the jurisdictional inquiry hinges on whether the constitutional claims
23 presented to the district court ‘are *inextricably intertwined* with the state court’s
24 [ruling].’” *Hooper*, 56 F.4th at 624 (quoting *Cooper*, 704 F.3d at 778)) (emphasis in
25 original). “Claims are inextricably intertwined if ‘the relief requested in the federal
26 action would effectively reverse the state court decision or void its ruling.’” *Id.* at
27 624-25 (quoting *Fontana Empire Ctr., LLC v. City of Fontana*, 307 F.3d 987, 992
28 (9th Cir. 2002)).

1 Because the plaintiff in *Hooper* sought an order from the federal district court
2 stating that he was entitled to the DNA testing, the Ninth Circuit found that his
3 requested relief “would effectively reverse the state courts’ decision that he is not
4 entitled to the test.” *Hooper*, 56 F.4th at 625. It was a “pure horizontal appeal of the
5 state court’s decision,” and essentially amounted to an argument that “the state courts
6 decided his case incorrectly.” *Id.*

7 Similar to *Hooper*, the Judicial Defendants are alleged to have committed errors
8 in multiple state court actions. These errors include, but are not limited to, using
9 language to which Kamath takes exception, issuing adverse rulings against Kamath,
10 and rejecting court filings. (Dkt. No. 15 ¶¶ 57, 61, 70, 74, 141-142, 144-150, 153-
11 155, 158, 159, 163, 165, 173, 178, 187, 414, 447, 465, 493.) The FAC also seeks
12 relief from these purportedly erroneous acts by asking for damages and injunctive
13 and declaratory relief against the Judicial Defendants. (*Id.* Prayer for Relief ¶¶ 1-3.)

14 Because Kamath is complaining of allegedly erroneous conduct that occurred
15 in state court, and she seeks relief therefrom, the instant action is a forbidden de facto
16 appeal under *Rooker-Feldman*. This action also runs afoul of *Rooker-Feldman*
17 because the granting of the requested relief would undercut the rulings rendered by
18 the Judicial Defendants in state court. Kamath’s action is therefore barred by the
19 *Rooker-Feldman* doctrine.

20 **F. THE STATE LAW DAMAGES CLAIMS FAIL DUE TO**
21 **KAMATH’S FAILURE TO ALLEGE COMPLIANCE WITH**
22 **CALIFORNIA’S GOVERNMENT CLAIMS ACT**

23 Finally, California’s Government Claims Act mandates the filing of a claim as
24 a condition precedent to bringing a suit for “money or damages” against a judicial
25 branch defendant. Cal. Gov. Code §§ 811.9, 900.3, 905.7, 915(c)(1); 945.4; Cal.
26 Rules of Ct., rule 10.201. “A suit for ‘money or damages’ includes all actions where
27 the plaintiff is seeking monetary relief, regardless of whether the action is founded in
28 ‘tort, contract or some other theory.’” *Bates v. Franchise Tax Bd.*, 124 Cal.App.4th
367, 383 (Ct. App. 2004).

1 “The timely filing of a claim is an essential element of a cause of action against
2 a public entity” *Wood v. Riverside Gen. Hosp.*, 25 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1119 (Ct.
3 App. 1994); *see also State of California v. Superior Court (Bodde)*, 32 Cal.4th 1234,
4 1240 (Ct. App. 2004); *Del Real v. City of Riverside*, 95 Cal.App.4th 761, 767-68 (Ct.
5 App. 2002). The ““failure to timely present a claim for money or damages to a public
6 entity bars a plaintiff from filing a lawsuit against that entity.”” *City of Stockton v.*
7 *Superior Court*, 42 Cal.4th 730, 738 (Ct. App. 2007) (quoting *Bodde*, 32 Cal.4th at
8 1239); Cal. Gov. Code § 945.4.

9 The failure to present a government claim to a judicial branch defendant also
10 bars suit against any judicial branch employee who allegedly caused the injury. Cal.
11 Gov. Code § 950.2; *Mazzola v. Feinstein*, 154 Cal.App.3d 305, 310 (Ct. App. 1984)
12 (“It is settled that the filing of a timely claim against the employing public entity is a
13 condition precedent to a tort action against either the public entity or the employee.”).

14 As noted above, the FAC prays for damages in excess of \$100 million. (Dkt.
15 No. 15, Prayer for Relief ¶ 1.) Absent from the FAC, however, is any allegation that
16 Kamath presented a government claim. Given presentation of a government claim is
17 “an essential element of a cause of action against a public entity ...[,]” *Wood*, 25
18 Cal.App.4th at 1119, the state law damages claims against the Judicial Defendants
19 fail as a matter of law.

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IV.

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court should grant the Judicial Defendants' motion to dismiss. Because the deficiencies in the FAC are fatal and cannot be cured by further amendment, the action against them should be dismissed without leave to amend. *Thinket Ink Info Res., Inc. v. Sun Microsystems, Inc.*, 368 F.3d 1053, 1061 (9th Cir. 2004) (denial of leave to amend proper where amendment would be futile).

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